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"Prevention is the single most important dimension of
the responsibility to protect: prevention options should
always be exhausted before intervention is contemplated,
and more commitment and resources must be devoted to
it..1

International institutions are almost exclusively reactive to
violations of international law. 2 There are very few systemic
1.

INT'L COMM'N ON INTERVENTION & STATE SOVEREIGNTY, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO
REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON INTERVENTION & STATE

PROTECT:

SOVEREIGNTY XI (Int'l Dev. Research Centre 2001).
2. See Payam Akhavan, The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: The
Politics and Pragmaticsof Punishment, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 501, 501 (1996). The Author
argues that atrocities have been the "most effective catalyst" for building international
legal institutions. Id. He goes on to state:
In a sense, the decision to establish these Tribunals is yet another expression
of the reactive nature of the international human rights system. In the case
of Rwanda in particular, there was ample opportunity, but little willingness,
to take preventive action to intervene against what is perhaps the worst
genocide since the Second World War. At least one year before the massacres
of April 1994, which according to some estimates took the lives of as many as
five hundred thousand to one million people in just three months, United
Nations human rights experts and nongovernmental organizations had
forewarned of an impending calamity ....
Id. (citations omitted); see also Jim O'Brien, Remarks at the Fifth Annual Ernst C.
Steifel Symposium: 1945-1995: Critical Perspectives on the Nuremberg Trials and State
Accountability, Panel III in 12 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 631, 657 (1995); WHITE HOUSE
OFFICE

OF

COMMUNICATIONS,

THE

NATIONAL

SECURITY

STRATEGY

17

(2006),

http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2006/nss2006.pdf. The strategy mentions prevention
as a moral imperative, but then focuses on punishing perpetrators:
It is a moral imperative that states take action to prevent and punish
genocide. History teaches that sometimes other states will not act unless
America does its part. We must refine United States Government effortseconomic, diplomatic, and law-enforcement-so that they target those
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methods of proactively trying to prevent egregious violations;
rather, international law seems to take punishing violators as
its sole approach." In modern times, most of the punishment and
post-event enforcement has come through international courts
and tribunals. These courts and tribunals are astoundingly
individuals responsible for genocide and not the innocent citizens they rule.
Where perpetrators of mass killing defy all attempts at peaceful
intervention, armed intervention may be required, preferably by the forces of
several nations working together under appropriate regional or international
auspices.
We must not allow the legal debate over the technical definition of "genocide"
to excuse inaction. The world must act in cases of mass atrocities and mass
killing that will eventually lead to genocide even if the local parties are not
prepared for peace.
Id.; see also Nicole M. Procida, Note, Ethnic Cleansing in Bosnia-Herzegovina,A Case
Study: Employing United Nation Mechanisms to Enforce the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 18 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV.
655, 669 (1995). The Author lists the "maintenance of peacekeeping forces in troubled
areas, the continuous surveillance of human rights conditions, and the effort to provide
humanitarian aid" as methods that "contribute to the prevention of genocide." Id.
However, later in the Article, the Author admits that none of these seemed effective in
deterring the genocide in Bosnia. Id. at 679-80.
3. See Steven Lepper, Remarks at The Fifth Annual Ernst C. Steifel Symposium:
1945-1995: Critical Perspectives on the Nuremberg Trials and State Accountability,
Panel III, in 12 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 453, 652 (1995); Akhavan, supra note 2, at
501-03 (chronicling the establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda and stating that despite the international community's unwillingness to
intervene, it was willing to try the perpetrators after the atrocities had occurred); Rosa
Brooks, Time is Running Out for the Bad Guys, L.A. TIMES, July 10, 2005, at M5,
(tracing what has happened with many current leaders who have been responsible for
atrocities).
4. See Ruti G. Teitel, Humanity's Law: Rule of Law for the New Global Politics, 35
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 355, 368-69 (2002); Mark A. Drumbl, Collective Violence and
Individual Punishment: The Criminalityof Mass Atrocity, 99 NW. U.L. REV. 539, 551-77
(2005) [hereinafter Drumbl, The Criminality of Mass Atrocity] (discussing the use of
various punishment methodologies and their effectiveness); THE ALLARD K. LOWENSTEIN
INT'L HUMAN RIGHTS CLINIC & THE ALLARD K. LOWENSTEIN INTL HUMAN RIGHTS
PROJECT, AN ANALYSIS OF SELECT COMPANIES' OPERATIONS IN SUDAN: A RESOURCE FOR
DIVESTMENT 5 (Yale Law Sch. 2006) ("The United Nations has turned over a list of 51
,senior Sudanese government officials, militiamen, army officers, and rebel commanders'
to the International Criminal Court, which is preparing indictments against these
individuals for their role in the violence." (quoting Warren Hoge, International WarCrimes Prosecutor Gets List of 51 Sudan Suspects, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 2005, at A6));
Vincent 0. Orlu Nmehielle, Towards an African Court of Human Rights: Structuring the
Court, 6 ANN. SURV. INT'L & COMP. L. 27, 28 (2000) (proposing an African Court of
Human Rights as a way of enforcing the African Charter on Human and Peoples'
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expensive 5 and notoriously inefficient.6 More importantly, the
threat of prosecution does not appear to act as an effective
deterrent in preventing criminal acts.
Nowhere has the ineffectiveness of international courts and
tribunals been more dramatically demonstrated than in the area
of genocide. The twentieth century was marked by numerous
genocides,8 the last decade of the century illustrating with stark

Rights); Marlise Simons, Bosnia's Genocide Case Against Serbia Starts, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 28, 2006, at A8 (recounting the beginning of the 13-year-old International Court of
Justice case in which Bosnia is seeking financial compensation from Serbia for atrocities
committed by Serbian sponsored fighters during the Bosnian conflict); Thomas
Buergenthal, Proliferationof International Courts and Tribunals: Is it Good or Bad?, 14
LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 267, 267-71 (2001) (detailing the ever-expanding number of
international courts and tribunals).
5. See Fact Sheet
on ICTY
Proceedings,
http://www.un.org/icty/casese//factsheets/generalinfo-e.htm (charting the costs of the ICTY by year) (last visited Oct.
22, 2006); see also Post-Conflict Challenges: The Price of Healing, AFRICA NEWS, Aug. 4,
2006; James A. Goldston, Justice in Cambodia: Genocide Tribunals, INT'L HERALD TRIB.,
Aug. 2, 2004, at 6; David White, Special War Crimes Court: Trials Off to Mixed Start,
FIN. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2005, at 5; Tom Ginsburg, Bounded Discretion in International
JudicialLawmaking, 45 VA. J. INT'L L. 631, 665-68 (2005) (arguing that funding, or the
lack thereof, is often used as a method of controlling international courts and tribunals
or expressing displeasure or approval with their decisions).
6. UN Assembly Appraises Progress Made by War Crimes Tribunals-Judges
Describe Obstacles, M2 PRESSWIRE, NOV. 9, 1999, at 1 [hereinafter UN Assembly
Appraises Progress]; White, supra note 5. Compare Eric A. Posner & John C. Yoo,
Judicial Independence in International Tribunals, 93 CAL. L. REV. 1, 16 (2005)
[hereinafter Posner & Yoo, Judicial Independence] (arguing that making a tribunal
independent undermines its effectiveness), with Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie
Slaughter, Why States Create InternationalTribunals: A Response to Professors Posner
and Yoo, 93 CAL. L. REV. 899, 917-19 (2005), and Eric A. Posner & John C. Yoo, Reply to
Helfer and Slaughter, 93 CAL. L. REV. 957, 957 (2005) (continuing an ongoing debate
concerning the "effectiveness" of international courts and tribunals based on the
dependence of the judges).
7. Is a U.N. International Criminal Court in the U.S. National Interest?: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on InternationalOperations of the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations,
105th Cong. 48 (1998) [hereinafter Bolton's Statement] (statement of John R. Bolton,
Senior
Vice
President,
American
Enterprise
Institute),
available
at
http://www.iccnow.org/documents/lstSesPrepComSenatecfr.pdf.
8. See SAMANTHA POWER, "A PROBLEM FROM HELL": AMERICA AND THE AGE OF
GENOCIDE 503 (2002); see also GENOCIDE, WAR CRIMES AND THE WEST: HISTORY AND
COMPLICITY (Adam Jones ed., Zed Books Ltd. 2004) (accounting a multitude of twentieth
century genocides). See generally KURT JONASSOHN & KARIN SOLVEIG BJORNSON,
GENOCIDE AND GROSS HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS: IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
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clarity the international community's ineptitude at responding
to such atrocities.9 The international community has shown that
it can neither respond effectively to stop genocides once they
have begun, nor effectively deter others who are contemplating
genocide by responding after the atrocity with prosecution in
international courts and tribunals. This is unacceptable. With
hundreds of thousands of lives at stake, the international
community must take proactive steps to not only stop and deter,
but also prevent mass atrocities and genocides in the future.
This Article proposes one possibility that could be both efficient
and effective in accomplishing this vital task.
In offering a more proactive approach to preventing
atrocities as an alternative to post hoc courts and tribunals, this
proposal will not solve the major underlying problem in
preventing genocide: the lack of political will. There is no doubt
that until the international community decides to commit itself
to taking action in the face of mass atrocity, no other solution
will solve the problem. However, the actions proposed in this
Article, if embraced by the international community, will at
least provide an avenue of exchange for greater and more
reliable information that can then be mobilized to help mitigate
the problem and provide greater impetus for the international
community to take action.
Further, it is clear that some leaders who commit horrible
atrocities such as genocide simply will not be deterred,
regardless of the mechanism set up.' ° For them, this proposal
will also do little good. In their case, incapacitation is likely the
only solution. Unfortunately, incapacitation almost always relies
on international political will." On the other hand, for those
"caught up" in the planning, or forced to comply out of a sense of

93-105 (1998) for a much broader, but less detailed, account of genocides throughout
history.
9. See generally Procida, supra note 2 (chronicling the poor intervention in the
genocide in Bosnia-Herzegovina).
10. See Bolton's Statement, supra note 7, at 48.
11. See, e.g., Kofi Annan, Secretary-General of the UN, Address to the Stockholm
International Forum in Sweden: Genocide is a Threat to Peace, Requiring Strong, United
Action (Jan. 24, 2006) (transcript available at http://www.un.orgPubs/chronicle/20041
issue O1004p4.asp).
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self-preservation, this proposal will provide a significant
incentive to divorce themselves from such actions and become a
tool of intervention to stop the atrocity before it begins. It is
these partially culpable, but not undeterrable, minions of the
megalomaniac on whom this proposal will have the most effect.
During the events of the 1990s, the world has learned that
genocide occurs on such a broad scale that it is fair to say that
many people are involved in at least the early stages and most
often in the planning of the horrific acts before they are
accomplished.1 2 Armed with this information, international
institutions should provide a proactive method of enticing
individuals involved in the early planning stages to come
forward and report proposed genocidal activities or other mass
atrocities. Then these institutions must be willing to respond
aggressively to prevent the activities from occurring. Such a
program would not only have to provide incentives for those
with information to come forward but would also have to protect
them from the unscrupulous actors who will seek retribution for
being discovered in their illegal acts. It is this focus on seeking
preventive evidence and then securing that evidence through
protection of those willing to come forward that is completely
lacking as a current method to fight atrocity before it occurs. An
effective pre-atrocity incentive and protection program would
not only prevent long and expensive post-criminal act trials, but
more importantly, it would prevent the repetition of the
hundreds of thousands of deaths experienced in the genocides of
the last two decades.
Part I of this Article briefly analyzes the current method of
responding to mass atrocities such as genocides through
international courts and tribunals, demonstrating its expense
and inefficiency. Part II illustrates the need for a proactive
regime that will entice those with information to come forward
before the atrocities occur and the genocide has taken its toll.
Part III proposes a proactive regime designed to incentivize pre-

12. Akhavan, supra note 2, at 505 ("The Rwandese representative argu[ed] that an
international tribunal 'which refuses to consider the causes of the genocide in Rwanda
and its planning... cannot be of any use... because it will not contribute to eradicating
the culture of impunity or creating a climate conducive to national truth and
reconciliation.'" (quoting U.N. Doc. S/PV.3453, at 14 (1994))).
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atrocity informants to come forward with information and
protect them once they have come forward. The Article
concludes in Part IV.
I.

INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES TO GENOCIDE AND MASS
ATROCITY

Since World War II, the international community has been
slow to react to mass atrocities such as genocide. 13 Rather,
despite a great deal of verbal condemnation, 14 the only actions
taken by the international community have been reactive and
have centered, at least in the last two decades,1 5 around the
formation of ad hoc international courts or tribunals to "bring to
justice" those who were involved in the atrocities. 6 These
tribunals have often met with great acclaim and proponents
herald their "tremendous impact on the development of the
international criminal law system." 7 However, there are others
who do not believe that international courts and tribunals are
the right method to handle problems such as genocide. 8 Without
even considering detractors' legal arguments,' 9 much of the
13. See generally POWER, supra note 8 (chronicling the genocides in the 20th
century and the international community's responses).
14. See Joseph A. Keeler, Genocide: Prevention Through Nonmilitary Measures,
171 MILL. REV. 135, 168 (2002).
15. See generally Allison Marston Danner, When Courts Make Law: How the
International Criminal Tribunals Recast the Laws of War, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1, 4 n.3
(2006) ("Karen Alter... estimates that 63 percent of international judicial activity has
occurred in the last twelve years." (citing Karen J Alter, Do International Courts
Enhance Compliance with International Law?, 25 REV. ASIAN & PAC. STUD. 51, 52
(2003))).
16. See Ida L. Bostian, Cultural Relativism in International War Crimes
Prosecutions: The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 12 ILSA J. INTL &
COMP. L. 1, 18-19 (2005).
17. Daryl A. Mundis, The Judicial Effects of the 'Completion Strategies' on the Ad
Hoc InternationalCriminalTribunals, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 142, 142 (2005).
18. See, e.g., Bolton's Statement, supra note 7.
19. See generally Drumbl, The Criminality of Mass Atrocity, supra note 4
(analyzing the disconnect between current punishment modalities and the reality of
mass atrocity); Mark Osiel, The Banality of Good: Aligning Incentives Against Mass
Atrocity, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1751 (2005) (giving an outstanding account of the disparate
approaches to atrocity punishment between national and international courts, and
calling into question the legal coherence of both regimes); Alex G. Peterson, Order Out of
Chaos: Domestic Enforcement of the Law of InternalArmed Conflict, 171 MIL. L. REV. 1,

HOUSTONJOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 29:1

criticism has focused on the expense and inefficiency of these
20
tribunals, as well as their apparent failure as a deterrent. 21
Opponents argue that any legal or reconciliatory benefit from
these tribunals could be achieved in other ways, using a more
effective method at a much cheaper cost.22 A brief review of two
recent ad hoc tribunals will illustrate this point. 23
A. The InternationalTribunalfor the Prosecutionof Persons
Responsible for Serious Violations of International
HumanitarianLaw Committed in the Territory of the Former
Yugoslavia (ICTY).
In response to the genocide in Bosnia-Herzegovina that
began in 1991, 24 the United Nations Security Council issued
Resolution 808 that declared "an international tribunal shall be
established for the prosecution of persons responsible for serious
violations of international humanitarian law committed in the
70-77 (2002) (discussing the political influences acting on international courts and
tribunals and the effect that has on credibility).
20. Mundis, supra note 17, at 142; Maya Goldstein-Bolocan, Rwandan Gacaca: An
Experiment in TransitionalJustice, 2004 J. DIsP. RESOL. 355, 370 (2004).
21. Bolton's Statement, supra note 7.
22. See generally Goldstein-Bolocan, supra note 20 (arguing that the use of
domestic Gacaca courts could be amended to accomplish both a retributive and
reconciliatory process much more effectively than either current international or
domestic courts); see also Mark A. Drumbl, Punishing Genocide in Rwanda (Washington
& Lee Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Working Paper no. 2006-06, 2006), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=907667
[hereinafter Drumbl, Punishing Genocide in
Rwanda].
23. This Article will address the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of
Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law
Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), and the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide and Other
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of
Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other Such Violations
Committed in the Territory of Neighboring States between 1 January and 31 December
1994 (ICTR) because of their focus on genocide. It will not address in detail other
tribunals, such as The Special Court for Sierra Leone, that have not had the same focus.
For information on the Special Court for Sierra Leone, see Lisa Danish,
InternationalizingPost-Conflict Justice: The "Hybrid"Special Court for Sierra Leone, 11
BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 89 (2005).
24. See Procida, supra note 2, at 670-77 (providing a detailed chronology of the
events leading up to the establishment of the ICTY); Keeler, supra note 14, at 147-54
(giving a concise history of the genocide in Bosnia).
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territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991. "25 After
recognizing that ethnic cleansing had been occurring, the
Security Council, declared that "in the particular circumstances
of the former Yugoslavia the establishment of an international
tribunal would enable" the world "to put an end to such crimes
and to take effective measures to bring to justice the persons
who are responsible for them .... ,,26
The Security Council actually organized the ICTY through
and adapt the
amend
Resolution 82727 and has continued to
29
28
1411,30 1431, 31
1329,
1166,
Resolutions
Tribunal through
1481,32 1597, 33 and 166034 to meet its developing needs. The
ICTY has established Rules of Procedure and Evidence 35 and
Practice Directions36 to facilitate its operation. After almost
thirteen years in existence, however, there is a great deal of

25. S.C. Res. 808, 9113, U.N. Doc. S/Res/808 (Feb. 22, 1993); see also Danner, supra
note 15, at 18-22 (discussing the decision to establish the ICTY).
26. S.C. Res. 808, supra note 25, 919.
27. S.C. Res. 827, $1 13, U.N. Doc. S/Res/827 (May 25, 1993) (establishing the
tribunal).
28. S.C. Res. 1166, $ 7, U.N. Doc. S/Res/1166 (May 13, 1998) (amending articles 11,
12, and 13 of the Charter to establish a third Trial Chamber).
29. S.C. Res. 1329, 1 11, U.N. Doc. S/Res/1329 (Nov. 30, 2000) (amending articles
12, 13, and 14 of the Charter to allow for ad litem judges).
2-4, U.N. Doc. S/Res/1411 (May 17, 2002) (clarifying the
30. S.C. Res. 1411, 9191
principle of nationality before the Tribunal).
31. S.C. Res. 1431, 9 6, U.N. Doc. S/Res/1431 (Aug. 14, 2002) (amending articles 13
bis and 14 concerning judges).
32. S.C. Res. 1481, 914, U.N. Doc. S/Res1481 (May 19, 2003) (expanding the power
of ad litem judges in pre-trial proceedings).
33. S.C. Res. 1597, 1 6, U.N. Doc. S/Res/1597 (Apr. 20, 2005) (making ad litem
judges eligible for re-election).
34. S.C. Res. 1660, arts. 12-13, U.N. Doc. S/Res/1660 (Feb. 28, 2006) (concerning
the composition of chambers and the powers of ad litem judges).
35. RULES OF PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE FOR THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR
THE PROSECUTION OF PERSONS RESPONSIBLE FOR SERIOUS VIOLATIONS OF
HUMANITARIAN LAW COMMITTED IN THE TERRITORY OF THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA SINCE
1991, U.N. Doc. IT/32/rev.37 (2006), available at http://www.un.org/icty/legaldoc[hereinafter ICTY, RULES OF PROCEDURE AND
elbasic/rpe/procedureindex.htm
EVIDENCE].
36. ICTY, Practice Directions, http://www.un.org/icty/legaldoc-e/basic/practice/
practiceindex.htm (last visited Oct. 22, 2006).
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discussion as to its value considering its expense and
ineffectiveness.37
On its website, the ICTY proclaims its core achievements:
1) spearheading the shift from impunity to accountability by38
"holding individuals accountable regardless of their position,"
2) establishing an important, historically accurate record of
what transpired so that "[ilt is now not tenable for anyone to
dispute the reality of the crimes that were committed,"3 9
3) "[b]ringing justice to thousands of victims and giving them a
voice," 40
4) expanding the "boundaries of international
humanitarian and international criminal law" by setting a
"large number of legal and institutional precedents" such as a
"generalprohibition of torture in international law which cannot
be derogated from by a treaty, internal law or otherwise" and
that a crime against humanity "can be committed not only as
part of, but also just during an armed conflict,"4 ' and
5) "[s]trengthening the rule of law" by providing "an incentive to
reform the judiciaries in the former Yugoslavia" and being
"involved in training legal professionals from the former
Yugoslavia to enable them to deal with war crimes cases and...
to enforce international legal standards in their local systems.'2
As to the costs of these accomplishments, the ICTY argues that
[tihe expense of bringing to justice those most
responsible for war crimes and for helping to cement
the Rule of Law in the former Yugoslavia pales in
comparison to the true cost of the crimes: the lives lost,
the communities devastated, the private property
ransacked and the cultural monuments and buildings
destroyed forever.43

37. See Fact Sheet on ICTY Proceedings, supra note 5; see also UN Assembly
Appraises Progress,supra note 6.
38. Bringing Justice to the Former Yugoslavia: The Tribunal's Core Achievements,
http://www.un.org/icty/cases-e/factsheets/achieve-e.htm (last visited Oct. 22, 2006).
39. Id.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Not everyone agrees.
The budget for the ICTY continues to grow at a significant
rate. The budget for the 2006-2007 biennium for the Tribunal is
$310,884,000, which is a 5.9% increase from the previous
biennium,45 over 75% of which has traditionally gone to
"[slalaries and related personnel costs ' 46 of the 1,141 staff
members. 47 By the end of 2007, the total costs of the ICTY will
48
have been well over $1 billion. In exchange for this expense,
the Tribunal has indicted one hundred sixty-two individuals,
has fifty-nine of those in custody, and has completed fifty-five
trials with eighteen criminals still serving their sentences. 49 This
equates to a current cost of about $20 million for each completed
trial.5 ° This is a staggering figure and certainly brings into focus
the issue of the value of the trials given their extraordinary
expense.
While the five core achievements of the ICTY are laudable,
the question remains as to whether they are of sufficient value
to justify the continued existence of the Tribunal. More
importantly for this Article, the true question is whether these
funds would be better used in designing and administering a
program that proactively tries to prevent genocide by
incentivizing informants to come forward with the guarantee of
protection, not only sparing the money, but the lives of the
thousands who were slain in this awful series of atrocities.
44. See UN Assembly AppraisesProgress,supra note 6.
45. The Secretary-General, Budget for the International Tribunal for the
Prosecutionof Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of InternationalHumanitarian
Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991 for the biennium
2006-2007, $115, delivered to the GeneralAssembly, U.N. Doc. A/60/264 (Aug. 17, 2005).
46. Board of Auditors, International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons
Responsible for Serious Violations of InternationalHumanitarianLaw Committed in the
Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991: FinancialReport and Audited Financial
Statements for the Biennium Ended 31 December 2003, at 2, delivered to the General
Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/59/5/Add.12 (Aug. 10, 2004).
47. Fact Sheet on ICTY Proceedings, supra note 5.
48. Id.
49. Id. (detailing key figures of ICTY cases).
50. The infamous American trial of O.J. Simpson is estimated to have only cost
between $5 and $10 million. Martin McLaughlin & David North, The Simpson Trial:
Some Ugly Truths, IWB ONLINE (Oct. 9, 1995), http://www.wsws.org/public-html/
prioriss/iwbl0-9/simpson.htm.
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B. The InternationalCriminal Tribunal for the Prosecutionof
PersonsResponsible for Genocide and Other Serious
Violations of InternationalHumanitarianLaw Committed in
the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible
for Genocide and Other Such Violations Committed in the
Territory of NeighboringStates between 1 Januaryand 31
December 1994 (ICTR).
The ethnic killings in Rwanda that led to the genocide
culminating in 1994 began as early as 1990. 5' Despite some
warnings from various sources,52 the international community
responded ineffectively, and between April and July of 1994 an
estimated 500,000 to 800,000 Tutsis were killed.53 On November
8, 1994, in response to a formal request by the Rwandan
government, the Security Council passed Resolution 955:
[The Resolution] establish[ed] an international tribunal
for the sole purpose of prosecuting persons responsible
of
for genocide
and other serious violations
international humanitarian law committed in the
territory of Rwanda and Rwandan citizens responsible
for genocide and other such violations committed in the
territory of neighbouring States between 1 January
1994 and 31 December 1994 ....
As will be discussed below, despite its initial request and
enthusiasm for the project, Rwanda was very dissatisfied with
the ICTR at its final creation in 1994. However, the ICTR
statute was promulgated in 1994 and the seat of the court,
Arusha, Tanzania, declared in UNSC Resolution 977."5 The court
was based very closely on the ICTY model and even shared the

51. See Bostian, supra note 16, at 15-16; see also ALISON DES FORGES, LEAVE
NONE TO TELL THE STORY: GENOCIDE IN RwANDA 4 (1999) available at
http://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/rwanda/index.htm#TopOfPage; Keeler, supra note 14,
154-63 (giving a concise history of the Rwandan genocide).
52. See Bostian, supra note 16, at 16; DES FORGES, supra note 51, at 18.
53. Drumbl, Punishing Genocide in Rwanda, supra note 22, at 5; DES FORGES,
supra note 51, at 15; Lisa Avery, The Women and Children in Conflict ProtectionAct: An
Urgent Call for Leadership and the Prevention of Intentional Victimization of Women and
Children in War, 51 LOY. L. REV. 103, 108 (2005).
54. S.C. Res. 955, 1, U.N. Doc. S/Res/955 (1994).
55. S.C. Res. 977, 1, U.N. Doc. S/Res/977 (1995).
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same prosecutor for several years until the Security Council
passed Resolution 150356 granting the ICTR its own prosecutor
in hopes of expediting the trial process.57
Like the ICTY, the ICTR has been lauded by supporters as
having accomplished great things since its inception, such as the
authoritative declaration of rape as an act of genocide.58 The
ICTR website prominently displays a quote from Kofi Annan:
The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
delivered the first-ever judgement [sic] on the crime of
genocide by an international court. This judgement [sic]
is a testament to our collective determination to
confront the heinous crime of genocide in a way we
never have before. I am sure that I speak for the entire
international community when I express the hope that
this judgement [sic] will contribute to the long-term
process of national reconciliation in Rwanda. For there
can be no healing without peace; there can be no peace
without justice; and there can be no justice without
respect for human rights and rule of law.5s
However, the website also contains a link to the tenth
anniversary commemoration site of the genocide, ° which
highlights the concerns about expense and efficiency of the
process that has taken so long and is still far from completion.

56. See S.C. Res. 1503, art. 15,
12, U.N. Doc. S/Res/1503 (2003); Rwanda: New
ICTR ProsecutorTakes Up His Post, AFRICA NEWS, Oct. 6, 2003.
57. Kigali Welcomes Appointment of New Prosecutorfor ICTR, PANAFRICAN NEWS
AGENCY DAILY NEWSWIRE, Sept. 9, 2003.

58. See Transcript of Record at 43-47, Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR
96-4-T, Judgment (Sept. 2, 1998), available at http://69.94.11.53/ENGLISHIcases/
Akayesu/judgement/akay001.htm (follow "AKAYSEU, Jean Paul" hyperlink). See
generally Alex Obote-Odora, Rape and Sexual Violence in International Law: ICTR
Contribution, 12 NEW ENG. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 135 (2005). But see Rwanda: When
Justice Takes Too Long, AFRICA NEWS, Sept. 1, 2003 ("Thousands of women were raped
or held in sexual slavery during the 1994 genocide. Many of them contracted HIV-AIDS
as a result. Nine years after the events, less than ten people have been convicted of rape
either in Rwanda or in the ICTR.").
59. International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: About the Tribunal,
http://69.94.11.53/default.htm (follow "ABOUT THE TRIBUNAL" hyperlink on the left
side of screen) (last visited Oct. 22, 2006).
60. International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: Commemoration Site,
http://69.94.11.53/commemoration/index.asp (last visited Oct. 22, 2006).
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Initially, Rwanda sought an international tribunal as a
means to "eradicate the creature of impunity, which has
characterized Rwandan society since 1959.61 When the ICTR
Statute was initially promulgated, Rwanda lodged its
dissatisfaction with the Statute.6 2 One of the grounds was its
certain inefficiency based on the "magnitude of the task."6 "In a
strongly worded protest, the [Rwandan] delegate [to the U.N.]
suggested that 'the establishment of so ineffective an
international tribunal would only appease the conscience of the
international community rather than respond to the
expectations of the Rwandese people and of the victims of
genocide in particular."' Rwanda's objections seem to have been
borne out as true. In 1999, five years after the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda had been established, it had
indicted forty-eight people and tried and sentenced five of
those.65 In the same period of time, Rwanda's domestic judicial
system had issued more than 20,000 indictments, accepted
guilty pleas in 17,847 of those cases, tried 1,989 people, and
released 5,760.66

61. Manzi Bakuramutsa, Rwandan U.N. Ambassador, Remarks at the Fifth
Annual Ernst C. Steifel Symposium: 1945-1995: Critical Perspectives on the Nuremberg
Trials and State Accountability, Panel III in 12 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 631, 643-44
(1995) ("The Rwandese, who had been taught that it was acceptable to kill as long as the
victim was from a different ethnic group or from an opposition party, cannot arrive at
national reconciliation unless they learn new values. National reconciliation can be
achieved only if accountable justice is established and if the survivors of genocide are
assured that what has happened will never happened again."). But see Drumbl, The
Criminality of Mass Atrocity, supra note 4, at 600-03 (arguing that in light of the ICTR,
international criminal tribunals that remove the criminal process from the local
populace do not "lead to the reform of criminogenic conditions" but externalize justice).
62. See Bostian, supra note 16, at 19-20.
63. Akhavan, supra note 2, at 506 (quoting U.N. Doc. S/PV.3453, at 15 (1994));
Bakuramutsa, supra note 61, at 647.
64. Akhavan, supra note 2, at 506 (quoting U.N. Doc. S/PV.3453, at 15 (1994)); see
also Bakuramutsa, supra note 61, at 650 ("Rwanda remains convinced that the
permanent interest of the international community in setting up the tribunal was to
appease its conscience in view of the fact that it had not responded to save the Rwandese
from genocide.").
65. UN Assembly Appraises Progress,supra note 6.
66. Id.; see also Drumbl, PunishingGenocide in Rwanda, supra note 22, at 5-6. See
generally Goldstein-Bolocan, supra note 20 (discussing the use of Gacaca as a means of
accomplishing retribution and reconciliation within the Rwandan domestic legal system).
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The pace of the ICTR has not increased dramatically since
1999. The ICTR has currently completed twenty-eight cases (one
by the death of the accused, and five based on releases) with
seven of those cases currently on appeal.6 ' Twenty-eight cases
are currently at trial, and fifteen other defendants are in
custody awaiting trial. 68 The lack of results over the more than
ten-year time period leads again to a discussion of the value of
the ICTR. With total costs nearing $1 billion and continuing to
69
increase, the international community must reflect on whether
the benefit is worth the cost, or at least whether the ICTR is the
best use of that money 70 and effort if the goal is to prevent future
atrocities. 1 As one commentator has noted, this means that "it
costs roughly $25 million dollars to secure a single conviction at
the ICTR."72 Perhaps more proactive methods would better serve
the international community's interests.
C. The Future
There is no doubt that the International Tribunals
established by the United Nations in the past two decades have
been extremely expensive,7 3 particularly as compared to

67. International
Criminal
Tribunal
for
Rwanda:
Status
of Cases,
http://69.94.11.53/default.htm (follow "CASES" hyperlink on the left side of screen; follow
"Status of Cases" hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 22, 2006).
68. International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: Commemoration Site, supra
note 60.
69. The budget for the 2006-2007 biennium for the ICTR is $261,640,000, which is
a 2.5% increase from the previous biennium. The Secretary-General, Budget for the
InternationalCriminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide
and Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the
Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other Such
Violations Committed in the Territory of Neighboring States Between 1 January and 31
December 1994, for the Biennium 2006-2007, 1 13, delivered to the General Assembly,
U.N. Doc. A/60/265 (Aug. 17, 2005); see also Shana Eaton, Sierra Leone: The Proving
Ground for ProsecutingRape as a War Crime, 35 GEO. J. INT'L L. 873, 914 (2004).
70. See Bostian, supra note 16, at 20 (arguing that the money would have been
better spent to "rebuild the shattered Rwandan justice system").
71. See Drumbl, The Criminality of Mass Atrocity, supra note 4, at 588-92.
72. Id. at 601.
73. In "2004, the Tribunals' annual expenditures constituted 15 percent of the
entire U.N. budget." Danner, supra note 15, at 25.
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corresponding domestic court systems 4 These costs caused the
United Nations Security Council to pass resolutions calling for
the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia
(ICTY) and Rwanda (ICTR) to stop issuing new indictments by
the end of 2004 and complete operations by 2010.' 5 However,
these costs do not seem sufficient to deter the international
community from using courts and tribunals as the only response
to genocide and other mass atrocities.
When conditions became favorable to pursue accountability
in Cambodia7 6 for the 1.7 million deaths caused by the Khmer
Rouge regime between 1975 and 1979, 77 an international
tribunal seemed the preferred answer. 8 Cambodia and the U.N.
agreed to a plan for the tribunal,79 which was ratified by the
Cambodian Parliament in October, 2004.80 Funding and other
logistical concerns are still a problem, but recent donations seem
to be helping, 1 especially a $21.6 million donation from Japan 2
74. Some have argued that the ICT's reliance on the U.N. for their immense budget
allows the Security Council to impose its will on the Tribunals and force them into
compliant lawmaking. However, the evidence does not appear to support this argument.
Id. at 44.
75. S.C. Res 1503,
7, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1503 (Aug. 28, 2003). For a statement by
Ambassador Stephan M. Minikes, U.S. Ambassador to the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe concerning UNSCR, see also U.S. Supports Completion Strategy
for War Crimes Tribunal, Nov. 5, 2003, http:llusinfo.state.gov/dhr/Archive/2003/Nov/06767701.html (indicating U.S. support for the ICT's completion strategy).
76. For a comprehensive site concerning the genocide and the proposed special
court, see The Cambodian Genocide Project, http://www.yale.edu/cgp/index.html (last
visited Oct. 22, 2006).
77. See Senior Khmer Rouge Leader Admits Genocide Occurred Under Regime,
CHANNEL NEwsASIA, Dec. 30, 2003; Seth Mydans, A Top Khmer Rouge Leader, Going
Public, Pleads Ignorance,N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3, 2004, at A4; Ben Kiernan, The Cambodian
Genocide and Imperial Culture (2005), available at http://www.yale.edu/cgp/
KiernanCambodia30thAnniversaryEssay.doc; Seth Mydans, Skulls Haunt Cambodia,
DemandingBelated Justice, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 2005, at A4.
78. U.N. Approves Establishment of Khmer Rouge Tribunal, JAPAN ECON.
NEWSWIRE, May 14, 2003.
79. Cambodia, U.N. to Formally Sign Pact on Khmer Rouge Trial, ASIAN POL.
NEWS, June 2, 2003.
80. Andrew Woodcock, UK Contributes to Khmer Rouge Tribunal, PRESS ASS'N,
Jan. 27, 2005.
81. Niko Kyriakou, Rights: U.N. Setting up Tribunal to Delve into Cambodia's
Past, INTER PRESS SERVICE, Mar. 29, 2005, available at http://www.ipsnews.net/
interna.asp?idnews=28069.
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amounting to almost half the initial cost of the court.

However,

Pol Pot, the predominant figure in the genocide, died in 1998,84
and the other dozen or so suspects are in their early seventies. 85
These facts seem to call into question the value that will be
86
gained from the vast expense of such a project. Even though
the specific crimes that occurred thirty years ago cannot be
prevented, perhaps the money would be better spent on a more
efficient method of reconciliation, or finding ways to prevent
similar events from happening elsewhere.
D. Effectiveness of CurrentMethodologies
One of the goals of any enforcement mechanism in law, and
particularly of judicial process, is to stop current violations and
to deter others from committing similar acts in the future.87 If

the enforcement mechanisms are incapable of doing these
things, their utility is questionable. In the case of genocide,
recent history has shown that the threat of prosecution and even
establishment of a tribunal is not effective in either halting
current atrocities or deterring future atrocities." 9
Deterrence is especially needed in the case of genocide and
similar atrocities. Even a magnificently efficient court system
will not bring back the millions who have suffered the ravages of
genocide over the past decade, all of which occurred while
international tribunals were actively operating. 90 A notoriously
nonefficient court system will be even less effective as a
deterrent.

82. Id.
83. The estimate for the first three years of the tribunal is between $56-$60
million. James A. Goldston, Justice in Cambodia: Genocide Tribunals, INT'L HERALD
TRn., Aug. 2, 2004, at 6; Numbers, TIME ASIA, May 16, 2005, at 13.
84. See Michael B. Farrell, For "Killing Fields" Survivors, A Sliver of Hope for
Justice, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Mar. 3, 2004, at 14.
85. Kyriakou, supra note 81.
86. Farrell, supra note 84, at 17.
87. See Drumbl, The Criminalityof Mass Atrocity, supra note 4, at 588-92.
88. Procida, supra note 2, at 684.
89. Post-ConflictChallenges, supra note 5.
90. United Nations Reform: Hearing before the S. Foreign Relations Comm., 109th
Cong. (July 21, 2005) (testimony of Newt Gingrich).
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Some have argued that despite the inefficiencies of the
international tribunal system, "the symbolic effect of
prosecuting even a limited number of the perpetrators,
especially the leaders who planned and instigated the genocide,
would have a considerable impact on national reconciliation, as
well as on deterrence of such crimes in the future."91 While it is
nearly impossible to prove how many people have been
successfully deterred from committing such atrocities, there is
striking evidence that in at least one case, the actual functioning
of the court has not prevented the repeat of genocide involving
the very country where the Tribunal is in the process of
prosecuting earlier crimes. 92
There may be a number of reasons for this. At least one
scholar has argued that international tribunals do not serve this
deterrent effect, as the decisions are not studied, or even known,
93 The events
by those who are likely to commit such atrocities.
in
94
conclusion:
this
support
to
seem
Sierra Leone
By January
1999, when the [Armed
Forces
Revolutionary Council/Revolutionary United Front]
launched its "Operation No Living Thing" attack on
Freetown, the ICTs had already handed down some of
their key decisions regarding rape as a war crime.
Moreover, two of those decisions, Celebici and
Furundzija, were handed down in the months just
preceding the attack. This seemed to have had no
impact
on
the
[Armed
Forces
Revolutionary
Council/Revolutionary United Front] leadership, if they
even were aware of such decisions, which itself seems
unlikely.95
Further, while the continuing promulgation of international
courts and tribunals increase the likelihood of leaders of

91. Akhavan, supra note 2, at 509; see also Danner, supra note 15, at 6, 45, 55-59
(arguing that the decisions of the ICTR and ICTY, though not formally given the power
of stare decisis, have been incorporated in the jurisprudence and military practices of
many nations).
92. Post-Conflict Challenges, supra note 5.
93. Eaton, supra note 69, at 902-03.
94. Id. at 903.
95. Id. (footnote omitted).
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genocides ending up in court at some point, some would argue
that such a trial is little deterrence. 97 The "inability to provide
swift adjudication frustrates [the] deterring effect"98 of trial at
all. Also, in some cases at least, awaiting trial provides a much
better life than the accused would otherwise enjoy. For example:
At the ICTR, prisoners who are HIV-positive receive an
excellent level of health care and access to medication
that few, if any, of the victims can claim...
[p]unishment actually keeps perpetrators alive to enjoy
a quality of life that exceeds that of [the] victims and
might well exceed that which they would claim were
they not to be "punished" at all. 99
This is certainly better treatment than their victims are
receiving.100 Finally, it is unlikely that the fear of being tried
before an international tribunal, especially when the maximum
penalty is less than that allowed by a domestic tribunal,0 1 will
act as much of a deterrent on someone intent on mass atrocities
or genocide. 10 2 This is strikingly illustrated by the recent events
in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Between 1999 and 2002,
even as the ICTR was sitting in judgment of those who
committed genocide in 1994, Rwandans were engaged with
Ugandan forces in the genocide of neighboring citizens from the
Democratic Republic of Congo. 0 3 The atrocities were of sufficient
scale to elicit a Security Council Resolution condemning the
"massacres and other atrocities carried out in the territory of the

96. Brooks, supra note 3.
97. Procida, supra note 2, at 684.
98. Id.
99. See Drumbl, The Criminalityof Mass Atrocity, supra note 4, at 579.
100. Rwanda: When Justice Takes Too Long, supra note 58 (quoting an HIV
infected rape survivor saying, "If something is not done soon there will come a time when
all of [the victims] will die. Many have already died and there is simply no institution
looking into this.").
101. See Drumbl, The Criminality of Mass Atrocity, supra note 4, at 579 (noting
that the ICTR cannot impose the death penalty, but Rwandan domestic courts can).
102. Id. at 590-91.
103. Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the
Congo v. Uganda), 2005 I.C.J. 66-68 (Dec. 19), available at http://www.icjcij.org/icjwww/idocket/ico/icoframe.htm (follow "Judgment of 19 December 2005"
hyperlink).
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Democratic Republic of the Congo,"1 °4 and ordering both the
Ugandan and Rwandan forces to "make reparations for the loss
of life and the property damage they have inflicted on the
civilian population in Kisangani." 1 5 If a people who recently
suffered personally and as a nation from genocide and are
deeply embroiled in the international and domestic prosecution
of those who committed such crimes will turn to genocide again
so quickly, it appears that post-atrocity adjudication is not the
deterrent the international community requires.
There is another twist on the idea of deterrence with
international courts and tribunals. Whereas, the court's
deterrent effect on perpetrators is doubtful, its deterrent effect
on potential interveners may be more obvious. As was clearly
demonstrated with the United States and the International
Criminal Court (ICC), some nations may have reservations to
granting broad powers to even an ad hoc tribunal.i°6 The United
States made this very clear:
[The US] fear that a Court with broad powers would
impair its ability to provide global security and thereby
jeopardize the global status quo led it to adopt a
conservative view of the Court's jurisdiction. The main
concern of the United States was that American troops
deployed across the globe would be subject to politicized
prosecutions .... 7
The apparent concern of the United States that its
peacekeepers may become subject to ICC prosecution applies
equally to those nations contemplating intervention in a
genocide. A nation that voluntarily sends its soldiers to
intervene must account for potential repercussions to its
soldiers, and resulting political embarrassment, beyond those
initially implicated.0 Because of this, the reliance on courts and
tribunals may have the inadvertent effect of acting as a

104. S.C. Res. 1304, 1 13, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1304 (June 16, 2000).
105. Id. T114.
106. Dan Belz, Is InternationalHumanitarianLaw Lapsing into Irrelevance in the
War on InternationalTerror?,7 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 97, 125 (Jan. 2006).
107. Id.
108. Kyriakou, supra note 81 (drawing attention to the support offered by the
United States at various times to the regime of Pol Pot).
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deterrent not only on perpetrators but also on nations who
might otherwise have sent forces to intervene, but won't for fear
of opening themselves up to potential prosecution in an
international tribunal based on their own misconduct.109
In conclusion, it appears clear that international courts and
tribunals are extremely expensive and not very efficient at
providing timely prosecution of the perpetrators of mass
atrocities such as genocide. Though there may be many who will
still argue that such prosecutions serve a vital purpose and
should be continued,1 ° even these avid supporters could likely
be persuaded to look into other methods of dealing with
genocide, especially one that would promote a much more
proactive focus on prevention. Surely trying to develop effective
methods to prevent the atrocities from occurring is of greater
value than adequately dealing with them after they have
occurred. The next section turns to this focus.
II.

NEED FOR A BETTER SYSTEM THAT IS PROACTIVE

Mass atrocities, such as genocide, are horrific in their scope
and consequences. As Mark Drumbl has written, "The prevailing
paradigm views mass atrocity as something greater than the
sum of its parts, namely each of its ordinary constituent
murders. Under this paradigm, mass violence is constructed as
[an] extraordinar[y] transgressi[on] of universal norms.""' The
sheer scale of these acts is difficult to comprehend without
facing them in person.112
In Rwanda, it is estimated that as many as 800,000
Rwandans were killed within a four month period during the
109. See Eritrean Scholar Lashes into UN Peacekeeper'sBehaviour, BBC, May 10,
2004 (alleging the sexual abuse of a 13-year-old Eritrean girl by Danish peacekeepers as
well as other atrocities from Somalia); Joseph Farah, Those U.N. PeacekeepingAtrocities,
WORLDNETDAILY, June 25, 1997, available at http://www.worldnetdaily.com/news/
article.asp?ARTICLEID=14271 (cataloguing the murder of a Somalian boy by Belgian
peacekeepers).
110. Akhavan, supra note 2, at 501.
111. Drumbl, The Criminalityof Mass Atrocity, supra note 4, at 540.
112. For excellent accounts of the personal effects of genocide, see generally THE
NEW KILLING FIELDS: MASSACRE AND THE POLITICS OF INTERVENTION (Nicolaus Mills

and Kira Brunner eds., 2002), and PHILIP GOUREVITCH, WE WISH TO INFORM YOU THAT
TOMORROW WE WILL BE KILLED WITH OUR FAMILIES: STORIES FROM RWANDA (1998).
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1994 Rwandan Genocide. 113 The total deaths from the genocide
amount to half of the Abututsi population in Rwanda at the
time. 114 That is the equivalent of killing the entire population of
the state of South Dakota, the fifth least-populated state in the
United States." 5 In the case of Bosnia, "some 200,000 Bosnians
were killed [and] more than 2 million were displaced" while "the
United States, Europe, and the United Nations stood by."116 It is
hard to justify the international community's belated response
to these genocides".7 when comparing it with the response to the
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.
This is particularly true when considering that under the
Genocide Convention, signatories commit to "prevent and to
punish" in declared cases of genocide.1'8 While an international
court or tribunal can provide minimal punishment options to a
minimum number of ringleaders,"1 9 it does nothing to prevent a
genocide from occurring and, as discussed above, has little if any
deterrent effect. More energy, more focus, and certainly more
resources need to be put toward the commitment to prevent
genocide and other mass atrocities before they occur.120
An effective early-warning system is required to truly
protect the potential victims of genocide. 121 There is no need to

113. Avery, supra note 53, at 108.
114. Bakuramutsa, supra note 61, at 640.
115. See United States' Population by State, http://www.factmonster.com/ipka/
A0004986.html (last visited Oct. 22, 2006).
116. POWER, supra note 8, at 251.
117. Not only did it take eighteen months to select a prosecutor for the ICTY, but
"[bly 1996, the peacekeepers on the ground in Yugoslavia had not made a single arrest.
By 1997, only seven people were in custody, and most of those had surrendered
voluntarily to the Tribunal." Danner, supra note 15, at 24 (citations omitted).
118. See Convention on the Prevention and the Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277, art. I [hereinafter Genocide Convention].
119. See Brooks, supra note 3.
120. See Harold Hongju Koh, A United States Human Rights Policy for the 21"
Century, 46 ST. LouIs U. L.J. 293, 323 (2002) ("[T]he broadest challenge the United
States faces is not simply to redress past abuses, or to minimize current ones, but to
develop a consistent strategy to prevent future human rights abuse, by promoting early
warning, preventive diplomacy, and long-term promotion of democracy worldwide in all
of its dimensions.").
121. See Keeler, supra note 14, at 138; Avery, supra note 53, at 137-38;
JONASSOHN & BJORNSON, supra note 8, at 93-105; INT'L COMM'N ON INTERVENTION &
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wait for the atrocities to begin to take action. For example, the
Genocide Convention makes not only the commission of genocide
punishable, but also conspiracy to commit genocide, direct and
public incitement to commit genocide, attempts to commit
genocide, and complicity in genocide.1 22 The recent events in
Bosnia and Rwanda demonstrate that genocides happen in
stages, often with the commission of small-scale atrocities
initially to test international reaction.123 In Bosnia, "[t]he Serbs
'tested the water' in 1991 when they tortured and killed Croats
Because the Muslims and the
in so-called labor camps ....
Croats were unable to stop the Bosnian-Serbs, and the
international community did not seem to care, the genocide
simply accelerated." 2 4 In the case of Rwanda, there is clear
evidence that many people within the Rwandan government

STATE SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 1,

3.10-3.11.

It is possible to exaggerate the extent to which lack of early warning is
a serious problem in government and intergovernmental organization
these days. More often than not what is lacking is not the basic data,
but its analysis and translation into policy prescription, and the will to
do something about it. Far too often-and the recent reports on the
UN response to Rwanda in 1994 confirm this-lack of early warning is
an excuse rather than an explanation, and the problem is not lack of
warning but of timely response.
3.11 All that said, there is a need for more official resources to be devoted to
early warning and analysis. Preventive action is founded upon and
proceeds from accurate prediction, but too often preventive analysis, to
the extent that it happens at all, fails to take key factors into account,
misses key warning signs (and hence misses opportunities for early
action), or misreads the problem (thereby resulting in application of
the wrong tools). A number of distinct problems weaken analytic
capacities to predict violent conflict: the multiplicity of variables
associated with root causes of conflict and the complexities of their
interactions; the associated absence of reliable models for predicting
conflict; and simply the perennial problem of securing accurate
information on which to base analyses and action.
This Early Warning and Analysis section from the report highlights the benefit of an
insider coming forward with clear evidence, thereby removing the requirement for as
much predictive analysis. Id.
122. See Genocide Convention, supra note 118, art. III; Procida, supra note 2, at
668 (citation omitted).
123. Keeler, supra note 14, at 168 (citation omitted).
124. Id.
3.10
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knew of the plans to execute a genocide 125 and that "pilot projects
for extermination [were] successfully tested" before the full-scale
genocide of April 1994 occurred. 126 The hierarchy in the
government and military had to be recruited to commit the
genocide. 127 It was not until 1994 that the genocidal leaders
28
began in earnest the mass recruitment of the Hutu populace.
A program that provided true incentives for those on the
inside of the planning stages of genocide to come forward with
clear evidence, coupled with an effective protection scheme for
those who do come forward, would be a step in the direction of
proactive prevention rather than passive retribution.
III. INCENTIVIZING THE INFORMANT BEFORE THE ATROCITY
OCCURS AND PROTECTING HIM

As previously mentioned, "Mass atrocity could not occur
without the organized cooperation of many, often numbering in
the several thousands." 129 This element of group participation is
fairly unique to this type of crime:1 30 "Contrasted with
conventional crimes conducted by a single person or small cabal,
state atrocities are instead often 'the product of collective,
systematic, bureaucratic activity, made possible only by the
collaboration of massive and complex organizations in the
execution of criminal policies initiated at the highest level of
government.' 1 3 Because of this need for mass recruitment to

125. See POWER, supra note 8, at 333 (stating that "f1lists of victims had been
prepared ahead of time" in anticipation of the April massacres).
126. Akhavan, supra note 2, at 505 (pointing out that this lack of accounting for
the time period in which numerous individuals were engaged in planning the genocide
was one of the reasons that Rwanda objected to the final ICTR Statute (quoting U.N.
Doc. S/PV.3453, at 14 (1994))); Bakuramutsa, supra note 61, at 645-46.
127. DES FORGES, supra note 51, at 6.
128. Id. at 10-11.
129. Osiel, supra note 19, at 1752 (citation omitted). The same source later states,
"[Aimbitious administrators define target categories and compete for jurisdiction;
different officials pass sentences or create administrative authorities; others arrest, some
load onto trains, others unload, some guard, others herd people to the killing ground or
into the gas chambers; still others shake the cyanide crystals into the vents." Id. at 1767
(quoting CHARLES S. MAIER, THE UNMASTERABLE PAST 69-70 (1988)).
130. See Osiel, supra note 19, at 1751-53.
131. Id. at 1767 (quoting David Cohen, Beyond Nuremberg: Individual
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accomplish the insidious task, there are numerous insiders who
know the plan, even at the earliest stages. It is these insiders
that the international community must access and enlist.
Despite the often widespread knowledge of the plans for
mass atrocities, both inside and outside the government
structure, there is often little usable information available to the
international community. For example, in the case of Bosnia,
thousands of acts of genocide occurred without the U.N. feeling
they had sufficient information to take effective action, 132 even
though they knew atrocities were occurring as early as April
1992.133 Often the problem is the source of the information.
Either the information
.
134 is not confirmable or the source is
considered unreliable. This highlights the desperate need for
someone on the inside to come forward and provide clear
evidence as to the plans and execution of these activities. A true
insider would provide information that overcomes both of these
hurdles and would present the international community with a
clear and reliable picture of the atrocities that are planned or
already occurring, as well as who is responsible for them.
A program that incentivizes insiders to come forward with
prosecutable evidence during the planning stages is a vital step
toward preventing rather than merely responding to such
egregious behavior. Current international law and policy seek
ways "to elicit the bystander's altruism and thereby override the
risks he faces in acting to prevent harm."35 Quite obviously,
these methodologies are insufficient, and a more effective
incentive system must be utilized. As Mark Osiel puts the
question, "How might the law more effectively induce such
bystanders to honor their duty, in a way commensurate with the
actual wrongfulness of its violation?" 136 The answer is to provide
Responsibility for

War

Crimes, in

HUMAN

RIGHTS

IN

POLITICAL

TRANSITIONS:

GETTYSBURG TO BOSNIA 53 (Carla Hesse & Robert Post, eds., 1999)).
132. See Procida, supra note 2, at 679-80.
133. See POWER, supra note 8, at 264-69 (providing a detailed analysis of the
information about Bosnian atrocities available to the international community and also
discussing why action was not taken immediately).
134. See INT'L COMM'N ON INTERVENTION & STATE SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 1,
3.10-3.12 (noting the difficulties in obtaining accurate and reliable information).
135. Osiel, supra note 19, at 1844.
136. Id. at 1858. Osiel turns his attention mainly to post-event remedies but does
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not only alluring incentives to come forward but also sufficient
assurances of protection after coming forward, so that the
insider will be willing to take the risks. Osiel points out in
it is more effective to rely on
answering his own question that
137
market forces than on altruism.
A remarkable illustration of this need occurred in advance of
the genocide in Rwanda. Prior to the atrocities actually
occurring, the U.N. Commander, Major General (MG)
Dallaire," was informed by Tigh-ranking military officers from
within the Hutu government" that Hutu militias were planning
massacres. 1 39 Further, in January 1994, an insider informant,
known only as Jean-Pierre, provided excellent intelligence to
MG Dallaire concerning the training and arming of "highly
efficient death squads" who were "mak[ing] lists of the Tutsis in
their various communes" that "could kill a thousand Tutsis in
Kigali within twenty minutes of receiving the order." 4 ° In
exchange for feeding this information, Jean-Pierre requested to
have "all his Rwandan francs exchanged for U.S. dollars and to
be given passports for himself and his family to a friendly
Western nation."' 4 ' MG Dallaire was able to take some limited
actions based on this accurate and timely information, 4 2 but he
was not able to provide the requested travel arrangements for
Jean-Pierre because "New York [the U.N.] said it could not
become involved in 'covert' activities such as providing him with
travel documents." 4 3 By the end of January, Jean-Pierre had

argue that incarceration is not sufficient and that the international community has to
take a more creative approach to punishment. Id. at 1846-50.
137. Id. at 1855-58.
138. MG Dallaire has recently released a book describing his experiences in
Rwanda. ROMEO DALLAIRE, SHAKE HANDS WITH THE DEVIL: THE FAILURE OF HUMANITY

IN RWANDA (2003).
139. POWER, supra note 8, at 343.
140. DALLAIRE, supra note 138, at 142.
141. Id. at 143.
142. See Id. at 146 (describing how MG Dallaire, after cabling the U.N. with the
information, received a return cable telling him to do nothing and to inform the local
Rwandan authorities of the information). This highlights the problem of political will,
discussed below.
143. Id. at 150.
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faded away, never to be found or heard of again. 14 MG Dallaire
concludes his account by writing, "Whether he had engineered
an escape on his own or was uncovered and executed, I have
never been able to find out. The more troubling possibility is
that he simply melted back into the Interahamwe, angry and
disillusioned at our vacillation and ineffectiveness, and became
,,145
a g6nocidaire.
These examples illustrate the need to appropriately
incentivize insiders to come forward as informants and then
provide adequate measures of protection once they do. While
political will is still the most important element of preventing
genocide, surely the more accurate and reliable information that
can be presented to the international community, the more
likely the international community will be to take some form of
decisive action. The rest of this part of the Article analyzes these
issues in greater detail and argues for a system that incentivizes
insider informants through various means, including assurances
of protection. Such a program would have potentially had a
profound effect on MG Dallaire and his ability to intervene prior
to the genocide, and also may have acted as a strong deterrent
on the genocidal conspirators as well as spurred the
international community into action.
A. An International"Whistleblower" System
In order for incentives to work, they must be sufficient to
encourage the insider with information to come forward.146 These
incentives would be akin to the "whistleblower" systems that are
found in most modern countries.14 The idea behind a
whistleblower system is that someone on the inside knows what
14 8
wrongful acts are either being planned or have occurred.

144. Id. at 151.
145. Id.
146. See, e.g., Chris Strohm, Security Agency Whistleblowers Seek Stronger
Protections (Feb. 14, 2006), available at http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0206/
021406cl.htm.
147. See, e.g., Whistleblower Protection Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1222 (1989); Public
Interest Disclosure Act, 1998, c. 23, §§ 43A-43H, 43J-43L (Eng.), available at
http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/actsl998/19980023.htm.
148. See Developments in the Law: Corporations and Society, 117 HARv. L. REV.
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Whistleblower legislation incentivizes the inside individual to
come forward and provide the information to facilitate
intervention before the event or prosecution after the event.'49
Whistleblower legislation not only provides financial or other
incentives to come forward, but also provides protections to
those who do come forward as a further means of securing their
cooperation.1 50 A similar system could work effectively on an
international scale as well in an effort to interrupt mass
atrocities such as genocide.
The idea of an international whistleblower program is not
without some antecedents. Corporate America, including
international corporations, uses whistleblowers as third party
enforcement authorities. 151 Whistleblower systems have proven
effective in getting people involved in crimes to come forward
after the events in a truth and reconciliation type program.12
The United Nations has even recognized the value of
whistleblowers and has proposed legislation for domestic
regimes in an attempt to promote anticorruption. 153 In the

United States' 2003 Women and Children in Conflict Protection
Act, 154 the Coordinator is urged to encourage the UNHCR and
other Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs) to develop a
whistleblower system 155 to encourage victims to come forward in
an environment of confidentiality and free of retribution.156
While this does not establish clear incentives to come forward as
this Article proposes, and is targeting victims rather than

2227, 2244-45 (2004).
149. See Nicholas A. Goodling, Note, Nigeria's Crisis of Corruption- Can the U.N.
Global Programme Hope to Resolve the Dilemma?, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 997, 1020
(2003).
150. See 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)-(9) (1966).
151. See Developments in the Law, supra note 148, at 2244-45 (discussing a recent
attempt to install a similar liability on corporate attorneys).
152. Bill Keller, South Africa Imperative: Confess and Be Forgiven, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 4, 1992, at E6; Rwanda: Gacaca Justice Made in Prison, AFRICA NEWS, Jan. 20,
2003.
153. See Goodling, supra note 149, at 1020.
154. Women and Children in Conflict Protection Act of 2003, S. 1001, 108th Cong.
(2003) [hereinafter Conflict Protection Act].
155. Id. § 305 (a)(1).
156. Avery, supra note 53, at 129.
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insiders, it is recognition of the value of the whistleblower
principle in situations of mass atrocities or genocide.
The vital advance in this area, however, must be to turn the
focus to prevention and intervention, rather than prosecution
and reconciliation."' As has been illustrated earlier in the
Article, the costs of mass atrocity and genocide in terms of time
and money spent prosecuting after the fact, and more
importantly, in human lives and damage to the collective
conscience, are too expensive to continue to pay. 1, 8 Proactive
methods of discovery that provide prosecutable evidence and
support intervention are of inestimable value and must be
pursued.
How would such a system work? Though there are
numerous ways to create and manage an effective system of
incentives, one way would be through the newly formed Human
Rights Council.15 9 The Council is currently responsible for
"promoting universal respect for the protection of all human
rights and fundamental freedoms for all, without distinction of
any kind and in a fair and equal manner" 160 and does this by
"address[ing] situations of violations of human rights, including
gross and systematic violations, and mak[ing] recommendations
thereon. It should also promote the effective coordination and
the mainstreaming of human rights within the United Nations
system." 6' The Council is further tasked to "[clontribute,
through dialogue and cooperation, towards the prevention of

157. See Koh, supra note 120, at 323 ("The sobering fact is that the problem is
usually not an absence of information. Rather, the problem is getting the right
information into the right hands at the right moment, before large-scale abuses actually
take place, in time to generate political will necessary to head off the explosion of
atrocities.").
158. See, e.g., Post-Conflict Challenges, supra note 5 (discussing economic costs of
ICTR and ICTY); Genocide in the 20th Century, http://www.historyplace.com
worldhistory/genocide/index.html (last visited Oct. 22, 2006) (detailing number of deaths
in recent major genocidal incidents).
159. See Press Release, United Nations General Assembly, General Assembly
Establishes New Human Rights Council by Vote of 170 in Favour to 4 Against, With 3
Abstentions (Mar. 15, 2006) (available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/
ga10449.doc.htm) (announcing establishment of new Human Rights Council).
160. G.A. Res. 977, $ 2, U.N. Doc. AIRES/60/251 (Apr. 3, 2006).
161. Id. T 3.
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human rights violations and respond promptly to human rights
emergencies "162 and to "Wake recommendations with regard to
the promotion and protection of human rights."163 This clearly
gives a preventive, as well as remedial, role in human rights to
the Council.
In keeping with this charge, the Human Rights Council
could be the clearing house for insider allegations. The Council
could create hotlines where people can make anonymous calls to
begin the process of coming forward with evidence. Multiple
methods of communicating this information could be used and
published widely, particularly in those countries that the
Council thinks are at risk for atrocities or genocide to occur. By
working through regional organizations and representatives of
the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
dispersed across the globe, the Council can broaden its reach
and accessibility to ensure that an insider knows how to come
forward and can easily do so.
Once the Council has been informed of a plan to commit
mass atrocities or genocide, and presented evidence in support of
the allegations, it should be required to forward that
information to the Security Council, Secretary-General, High
Commissioner,' and the International Criminal Court. 165As the
Security Council, Secretary-General, and High Commissioner
determine the political actions to take on the information, the
International Criminal Court can be evaluating the evidence
and preparing a recommendation for the Security Council. Once
the individual has come forward, the ICC could play the major
role in the process as discussed below. It is uniquely qualified to
do so not only because of its innovative organization, but also
because it may end up as the forum for prosecution of those who

162. Id. 5(f).
163. Id. I 5(i).
164. See The High Commissioner, http://www.ohchr.org/english/abouthc/index.htm
(describing briefly the office and position of the High Commissioner of Human Rights)
(last visited Oct. 22, 2006).
165. See International Criminal Court, http://www.icc-cpi.int/home.html (giving
news and highlights of the ICC) (last visited Oct. 22, 2006).
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are planning to commit the atrocities 166 if domestic courts are
"unable or unwilling"167 to do so.
With a system of reporting in place, and an organization
ready to respond to the reports, it now becomes important to
provide the insider with incentives to come forward. While some
may do so for altruistic reasons, ss it is important to attract even
those who require some additional incentives to come forward.
Coupled with the promise of protection from retribution
discussed below, perhaps the most universal incentive is
monetary reward. A fund would need to be established, or
perhaps existing ICC funds could be augmented, 6 9 from which
to pay those who come forward with sufficient evidence. While
some may have moral or ethical issues with paying an insider
who may have even participated in the early stages of a
genocide, it is justifiable considering the opportunity to save the
lives of the thousands who might not be killed if the plan is
interrupted. Further, considering the billions of dollars already
166. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 5, July 17, 1998,
2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute] (giving the Court jurisdiction over genocide,
crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the crime of aggression).
167. Dr. Roy Lee, Remarks at Panel: The International Criminal Court:
Contemporary Perspectives and Prospects for Ratification, in 16 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM.
RTS. 505, 508 (2000); see also Bartram S. Brown, Primacy or Complementarity:
Reconciling the Jurisdictionof National Courts and International Criminal Tribunals,
23 YALE J. INT'L L. 383, 423-25 (1998); David J. Scheffer, Ambassador, Address to
Vanderbilt University Law School: Advancing U.S. Interests with the International
Criminal Court, in 36 VAND. J. TRANSNATL L. 1567, 1572-73 (2003); Michael Newton,
Comparative Complimentarity: Domestic Jurisdiction Consistent with the Rome Statute
of the InternationalCriminal Court, 167 MIL. L. REV. 20, 26-27 (2001). But see Keeler,
supra note 14, at 171 (arguing that the ICC will be ineffective without some further
enforcement mechanism because as long as those committing the genocide are winning,
it is unlikely that the ICC will be able to pursue prosecutions); W. Chadwick Austin &
Antony Barone Kolenc, Who's Afraid of the Big Bad Wolf? The International Criminal
Court as a Weapon of Asymmetric Warfare, 39 VAND. J. TRANSNAVL L. 291 (2006)
(arguing that the ICC may be used as a tool of asymmetric warfare against the United
States).
168. See generally Elletta Sangrey Callahan & Terry Morehead Dworkin, The State
of State Whistleblower Protection, 38 AM. Bus. L.J. 99 (2000) (comparing various state
and federal whistleblower statutes, and finding that those statutes combining incentives
and protection were far more successful than those relying on protection only).
169. See International Criminal Court: Trust Fund for Victims, http://www.icccpi.int/vtf.html (describing briefly the purpose and establishment of the fund, and its
current balance and pledges).
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spent on international tribunals, 170 the cost of this expense
would likely be minimal.
Immunity for previous acts is also likely to be an effective
incentive. The breadth of the immunity offered would need to be
discussed, but some form of immunity is certainly likely to
attract disaffected members of the criminal enterprise. The
immunity would have to cover both domestic and international
criminal proceedings to be effective, which would require some
Security Council implementation or intervention, but the value
of immunity as an incentive is uncontested.
Other incentives can and should be developed that will
attract the insider to come forward as early in the process as
possible. Adequately incentivizing those involved in the
development of the plans to come forward with evidence will
undoubtedly produce beneficial results in the fight against
genocide. The insider would have to demonstrate a willingness
to assist in any necessary investigation and testify at any later
criminal proceedings as part of the incentive package. The
greater the incentives, the more likely the insider will be to
come forward and the more likely the international community
will have sufficient evidence to intervene and prevent the mass
atrocity from occurring.
It is important to note that the Human Rights Council does
have a system of reporting human rights violations, known as
the "1503 procedure," which is currently in place and has
received quite a bit of use in its history. 17 The procedure was
established in 1970172 and then revised in 2000 by resolution
2000/3 of the Economic and Social Council 173 and is designed to

170. See Post-Conflict Challenges, supra note 5 (giving an estimate of the ICTY and
ICTR budget at $275 million annually).
171. See Zdzislaw Kedzia, United Nations Mechanisms to Promote and Protect
Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION, MONITORING,
ENFORCEMENT 3, 69 (Janusz Symonides ed., 2003) (noting that "the '1503 procedure'
processed 98,799 communications in 2000; 29,726 in 2001; and 18,492 in 2002.").
172. See U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC] Res. 1503 (XLVIII), U.N. Doc.
E/4832/Add.1 (May 27, 1970), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/huridocda/huridoca.nsf/
(Symbol)/1970.1503.En?OpenDocument.
173. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC] Res. 2000/3, U.N. Doc. E/2000/L.5
(May 3-10 and June 16, 2000), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/huridocda/
huridoca.nsf/(Symbol)/E.RES.2000.3.En?OpenDocument.
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provide a "channel for individuals and groups to bring their
concerns about alleged human rights violations directly to the
attention of the [Human Rights Council] .174 However, the
process is extremely cumbersome, technical, and would not have
been of any assistance in the
175 case of Jean-Pierre in Rwanda that
was previously mentioned.
To begin with, a prospective claimant must determine under
which body of international law he desires to file the claim. For
example, if he wants to file a complaint under an international
human rights treaty, he would have to file it with a different
organization than if he were filing it directly with the Human
1 76
Rights Council or the Commission on the Status of Women.
This would require a pretty savvy complainant or require the
complainant to go through some other organization such as an
NGO who can provide assistance.
Additionally, before a claim's merits can be considered, those
who review it must be satisfied that it meets certain
requirements of admissibility. 7 7 These requirements are quite
arduous and would undoubtedly have deterred Jean-Pierre if he
were faced with them. They include the requirement of
exhaustion of local remedies and a legal analysis of whether the
claim is compatible under relevant international treaties. 78 If a
claim passes this time-consuming hurdle it may be forwarded to
the alleged perpetrator state for comment, or it may be
considered by the reviewing committee as to the true merits of
the claim.179 If the committee determines that the claimant has
been the victim of a human rights abuse, it will inform the
claimant and the perpetrating state of its finding and then
follow up with the state after a period of time to see if remedial
actions have been taken. 8 °

174. Kedzia, supra note 171, at 69.
175. See supranote 143 and accompanying text.
176. See Fact Sheet No. 7/Rev. 1, Complaint Procedures, http://www.unhchr.ch/
html/menu6/2/fs7.htm (providing simplified explanations of the process under Res. 1503
and selected human rights treaties).
177. See Kedzia, supra note 171, at 69-70; Fact Sheet No.7/Rev. 1, supra note 176.
178. See Fact Sheet No. 7/Rev. 1, supra note 176.
179. Id.
180. Id.
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Though this complaint process may work well for some types
of complaints, it would certainly not have worked in the case of
Jean-Pierre in Rwanda. Instead, a much more responsive
system needs to be put in place, as suggested above. In the time
it would have taken Jean-Pierre to file his complaint using the
1503 procedures, the genocide would have been over, and
hundreds of thousands of Tutsis would already have been killed.
Even if the international community creates a wonderfully
efficient method of reporting plans for the commission of mass
atrocities or genocide, it would not be enough to sufficiently
entice the informed insider to come forward. Again, as clearly
illustrated by the situation with Jean-Pierre in Rwanda, the
need to provide some guarantee of protection for the informant
is fundamental to making this proactive system effective.
B. Protectingthe Whistleblower
Creative incentives will do much to encourage insiders to
come forward, but nothing will be as effective as the promise of
personal protection. Whether an insider comes forward with
evidence because of monetary reasons, other incentives, or for
altruistic reasons, he or she will still need assurances of
protection from those seeking retribution before coming
forward.18 ' MG Dallaire's experience with Jean-Pierre in
Rwanda is instructive. Though Jean-Pierre demonstrated a
sense of altruism by his apparent disgust for what was
happening, 8 2 his willingness to provide information was directly
tied to the provision of travel documents with their promise of
personal protection.183 Once the possibility of getting personal
protection disappeared, so did Jean-Pierre.8 4 This example of
the impact of providing protection as a method of incentivizing
informants is profound.
If this example is typical, personal protection is the most
important-and potentially the only really effective-incentive
181.

See ALEX ALVAREZ, GOVERNMENTS, CITIZENS, AND GENOCIDE: A COMPARATIVE

AND INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH 115-17 (2001) (relating interviews of individuals who
participated in the genocide out of a sense of personal preservation).
182. DALLAIRE, supra note 138, at 142.
183. Id. at 143.
184. Id. at 150-51.
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to get informed insiders to come forward before the atrocity has
occurred, and it must become the cornerstone of any proactive
methodology of preventing mass atrocities such as genocide. If
the international community is going to respond to its agreed
responsibility to prevent and not just punish genocide, it must
find effective ways to incentivize insiders to come forward early
enough in the process to allow effective preventive action. This
will not happen unless the international community provides
real protection for those who can provide verifiable information
on the planned mass atrocity and those responsible for planning
it.
As stated above, there is more than one way to provide this
vital service of whistleblower protection. One potential way is an
international witness protection program. In fact, some systems
designed to meet this need have already been created, though
with limited effectiveness. Both the ICTY5 5 and ICTR 1 6 have a
Victim Witness Protection program that handles relocation of
witnesses as part of the trial process. These programs have not
been particularly successful due to a number of reasons,
including the lack of financing, 8 7 but they recognize the
essential nature of a protection program when prosecuting
international crimes. Concerning the fate of female victims of
rape in Sierra Leone, Shana Eaton wrote, "If victim-witnesses
who do come forward are not provided full protection, including
anonymity, they may be stigmatized and unable to return to
their homes." 88 This same principle would be true of
whistleblowers who uncovered plans for genocide or other mass
atrocities and were willing to come forward. As Mark Osiel
writes, "Group members who share such potential evidence with
nonmembers
risk ostracism, banishment, and sometimes far
189
worse."
Here again, the ICC has useful practices that can already be

185.

ICTY, RULES OF PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE, supra note 35, R. 34.

186. INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RwANDA: RULES OF PROCEDURE AND
EVIDENCE, R. 34, U.N. Doc. ITR/3/REV.1 (1995); Fact Sheet 9, Witnesses and Victims

Support Section, available at http://www.un.org/icty/glance-e/index.htm.
187. Eaton, supra note 69, at 893-95.
188. Id. at 917.
189. Osiel, supra note 19, at 1854.
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applied to meet this vital need. Paragraph 6 of Article 43 of the
Rome Statute states:
The Registrar shall set up a Victims and Witnesses
Unit within the Registry. This Unit shall provide, in
consultation with the Office of the Prosecutor,
protective measures and security arrangements,
counselling and other appropriate assistance for
witnesses, victims who appear before the Court, and
others who are at risk on account of testimony given by
such witnesses. The Unit shall include staff with
expertise in trauma, including trauma related to crimes
of sexual violence.19 0
While this contemplates mostly a trial process protection, it
could be extended to cover whatever reasonable circumstances
were required to elicit the insider's evidence and then guarantee
his safety.' 9'
Having the ICC act as the clearing house makes sense for
several other reasons. Initially, once an insider comes forward,
some evaluation will have to be made of his allegations. The ICC
has access to trained mass atrocity prosecutors and other
experts who have dealt with such crimes in other
circumstances, 192 who are the ideal people to determine the
initial validity of a claim. Since the planners of the mass atrocity
or genocide may end up before the ICC at some point, either as a
result of early intervention or as a result of post hoc prosecution
if the international community fails to intervene in time, 9 3 this
would give prosecutors an early opportunity to gather evidence
and maintain witnesses necessary to prosecution.
190. Rome Statute, supranote 166, art. 43.
191. Note that article 68, paragraph 4 states, "The Victims and Witnesses Unit
may advise the Prosecutor and the Court on appropriate protective measures, security
arrangements, counselling [sic] and assistance as referred to in article 43, paragraph 6."
Id. art. 68. See also International Criminal Court: Victims and Witnesses Protection,
http://www.icc-cpi.int/victimsissues/witnessprotection.html (last visited Oct. 22, 2006).
Recommendations from the Victim Witness Unit could be expanded to cover
incentivizing insiders to come forward.
192. See International Criminal Court: Roster of External Legal Experts,
http://www.icc-cpi.int/otp/otp-roster.html (detailing reasons and selection process for
experts to whom ICC may turn when dealing with novel or complex situations).
193. See Rome Statute, supra note 166, art. 5 (giving the ICC jurisdiction over
genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the crime of aggression).
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One of the potential collateral risks of establishing a witness
protection program is that it would also incentivize some to
make false claims. This could occur for personal or political
reasons, but it would undoubtedly occur. Having the ICC
involved would help minimize the effects of false claimants on
the system. First of all, the ICC, in conjunction with the experts
from the Human Rights Council or its regional representatives,
will be well placed to assess the validity of the claim. If they
deem the claim to be false, they will also be well placed to assess
the motivation for the false claim. If the motivation is
pernicious, they can either choose to prosecute the false
claimant under international law,194 or they could turn him back
to the domestic legal system that is likely to have a crime under
which a false claimant could be prosecuted. It is likely that the
latter course of action would work as a significant deterrent to
false claimants because the government that was wrongly
accused of planning genocide would have quite an interest in
prosecuting the case.
Though the incentive of protection that would necessarily
include travel to a different country and limited financial
incentives would attract some false claimants, the time, effort,
and money spent on separating them from the true claimants
would be worth it if the process assisted in the proactive
prevention of genocide or other mass atrocities. This seems like
a small price to pay to gain access to the true informer who can
provide valuable information that may spur the international
community to act proactively.
Of all the potential incentives, providing personal protection
to the informant will go the farthest to bring the insider
forward. For some who detest the planned genocidal actions but
fear to speak because of possible retribution, protection becomes
the paramount hurdle to coming forward. Once protection is
offered, insiders will have much more incentive to come forward
with evidence of the criminal plans. This is not only important
for the insider to know, but also for the perpetrators to know.

194. No such crime currently exists at any of the international criminal tribunals;
however, the Rome Statute could be amended to add a crime if the problem became
serious enough.
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C. The DeterrentValue
As this Article has already argued, current methods of
responding to genocide with international tribunals that cost
hundreds of millions of dollars and take decades to complete
have not proven an effective deterrent to mass atrocity such as
genocide.' 95 In fact, in many cases, the alleged perpetrators are
far better off at an international tribunal than in domestic
courts. 196 Incentivizing informants to come forward early in the
process and widely publishing the incentives for those who come
forward may act as a more effective deterrent.
One of the keys to the "whistleblower" system being effective
is its wide publication. 197 Only if it is widely published and easily
initiated will insiders feel drawn to take part.'98 This same
publicity that will attract the insider to come forward will also
act as a restraint on the planner who must recruit large
numbers of people to participate in his crime. If Slobadan
Milosevic and his underlings would have had to constantly
worry if one of the members of their organization was on the
verge of calling an easily accessible number and providing
information on their illegal activities, it may have slowed them
down or at least contracted their circle and, thus, the scope of
their actions. The same is true of Rwanda, though possibly to a
lesser degree. As mentioned at the beginning of this Article, it
may be that some people are undeterrable and the only solution
is to incapacitate them within society. 99 In such cases, only
international political will and military capability can effectively

195. See supra Part I.
196. See supra notes 166-67 and accompanying text; see also Matthew J. Soloway,
Cambodia'sResponse to the Khmer Rouge: War Crimes Tribunal vs. Truth Commission,
8 APPEAL 32, 38-40 (2000) (discussing Pol Pot's 1978 trial in absentia and death
sentence, Cambodia's recent request for international tribunals similar to ICTR and
ICTY, and the U.N.'s insistence on certain precautions to avoid another "sham trial");
Justice Richard Goldstone, The Trial of Saddam Hussein: What Kind of Court Should
Prosecute Saddam Hussein and Others for Human Rights Abuses? 27 FORDHAM INT'L
L.J. 1490, 1490-92, 1501 (discussing various domestic and international options for
trying Saddam Hussein, but telling a cautionary tale about some of the failures of using
domestic judges in Kosovo trials).
197. Callahan & Dworkin, supra note 168, at 103.
198. Id.
199. See Bolton's Statement, supra note 7, at 50-51.
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intervene. However, in the cases where the person is deterrable,
knowing that someone involved in the planning is being offered
protection for information may have a significant effect on those
planning mass atrocities such as genocide.
As will be discussed, this will most likely only be an effective
deterrent if the international community shows the proclivity to
act decisively when insiders come forward. On the other hand,
with the international community's fickle track record, 200 a
person planning genocide will never know if his plan will be the
one that will spur the Security Council to take action. He must
decide if he is willing to take that risk.
D. Lack of Political Will
Even an effective early warning system, such as a
whistleblower system with appropriate protections for those who
come forward, will not solve the problem of mass atrocity or
genocide if there is a lack of international political will to engage
in the situation. 201 While it seems clear that arming the
international community with specific information would only
help encourage action, it will not guarantee action. Joseph
Keeler, recognizing this important point in the fight against
genocide, has proposed a Protocol to the Genocide Convention
that would establish a U.N. organization specifically designed to
prevent genocide. 202 The Protocol would also establish
mandatory actions upon the "occurrence of certain events."2 3
Solving the problem of mounting political will is beyond the
scope of this Article. As Nicole Procida has pointed out,
"Prompting the U.N. to address a genocide conflict and remain
actively involved requires extensive publicity."20 4 Further, it
must coincide with "national interests." 20 5 There is no doubt that
a host of insiders who come forward with damning information
200. Procida, supra note 2, at 662.
201. See Bakuramutsa, supra note 61, at 645 (arguing that the international
community was aware of the risks of genocide in Rwanda as early as 1991 but did
nothing).
202. Keeler, supra note 14, at 176-77.
203. Id. at 181-85.
204. Procida, supra note 2, at 670 (citation omitted).
205. See POWER, supra note 8, at 310-12.
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may be ineffective in spurring the Security Council to action.
However, a vocal host of insiders with clear prosecutable
information have a better chance than if that same host of
insiders remain part of the silent genociders or just disappear as
Jean-Pierre did.
Further, perhaps the most effective incentive is to actually
take action on the whistleblower's information. Though this can
only be established through a historical pattern, once
whistleblowers realize that if they come forward the
international community will actually take action and prevent
the atrocity, they will be encouraged to come forward, and those
contemplating mass atrocities will be significantly deterred. On
the other hand, if the information is available and known, and
no action is taken, not only will similarly situated insiders
remain silent,2 °6 but the perpetrators will act with even greater
recklessness in their egregious conduct.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Over the past century, and particularly the past two
decades, the international community has witnessed horrific
atrocities that have been carried out on a large scale and have
resulted in unbelievable human suffering. The response has
been to look on with horror, condemn the actions as violations of
international law, and then spend billions of dollars and take
decades to prosecute those responsible, while doing little to
prevent similar events from happening again. It is time to look
for another solution.
The most important goal of the international community
ought to be to prevent the genocide from occurring, even if that
means that those who planned it are not prosecuted. The chance
to save the lives of potential victims is the greatest reward for
taking preventive action. As these mass atrocities can only occur
after large scale planning and the recruitment of large numbers
of participants, interrupting the atrocity in the planning and
recruitment stage is the key to preventing genocide and saving

206. See Strohm, supra note 146 (recounting security-agency whistleblower
testimony, including an assertion that failure to protect whistleblowers will discourage
future employees from reporting wrongdoing that needs to be addressed).
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countless lives. A system that provides incentives for insiders to
come forward and then protects them from retribution is one
way in which the international community can interrupt the
atrocity process.
To be effective, the "whistleblower" system must be
adequately advertised, provide palpable incentives, and
guarantee the safety of the informant. It must also engage the
international community, including the Security Council, and be
backed by the possibility of quick and effective action. The
United Nations' Human Rights Council and International
Criminal Court are two institutions that could ensure the
effectiveness of this program. If nothing else, the establishment
of such a program may act as a deterrent on individuals or
groups contemplating genocide.
Whatever the costs of this incentive program, it is likely to
be cheaper and more efficient than the current international
tribunal system and more importantly, the millions who have
perished in the last two decades will not be followed by
additional millions in the next two decades.

